Safety Committee Resources

Getting Ready for Part 5: What the NBAA Safety Committee Is Working On

The May 2027 deadline for Part 5 Safety Management Systems is getting close. Part 135 and Part 91.147 operators must have an SMS in place by then, and the NBAA Safety Committee has several projects underway to help operators get there. Corporate flight departments operating under Part 91 aren’t required to comply, but many already follow SMS best practices and hold themselves to the same standard. The committee’s work is aimed at both groups.

That’s relevant here in Chicago as well! Between Chicago Executive, DuPage, Midway, Gary, Waukegan, Aurora and the surrounding fields, the region has a large mix of charter operators and corporate departments, many of them small. Here is what the committee is working on and how each piece supports Part 5 readiness.

Individual help with Part 5 compliance

A large flight department with a dedicated safety manager can usually work through Part 5 on its own. A two-pilot charter operator often can’t. The committee is working with operators individually to look at where each operation stands today and what it still needs, instead of handing out a generic template. The goal is an SMS that fits the operation and actually gets used, not one that only exists on paper for the inspector.

Videos on safety goals and mission

Safety promotion is one of the four components of Part 5, and it is often the one that gets the least attention. The committee is producing short videos that explain NBAA’s safety goals and mission in a way that’s easy to share with pilots, maintenance technicians, schedulers and line staff. They can be used in recurrent training, at local safety meetings and FAASTeam events, or simply to start a conversation inside a department.

Checklists for executives

Part 5 places responsibility for the SMS with an accountable executive. In many operations, that person is not a pilot and may not know what a healthy safety program looks like. The committee is building checklists that give executives and aircraft owners a practical way to review their own operation: how trips are scheduled, whether crews feel free to turn down a flight, how fatigue is handled, and whether the department has the resources it needs. For corporate departments, this is often the best way to bring leadership into the SMS conversation even without a regulatory requirement behind it.

Comparing human factors standards across audits

Many operators go through more than one audit program, such as IS-BAO and various charter audits. Each one handles human factors differently, including fatigue risk management, CRM and reporting culture. The committee is comparing these standards side by side so operators can see where they overlap, where they differ and where gaps exist. For an operator building out safety risk management and safety assurance under Part 5, this helps focus effort where it counts and avoids duplicated work.

Getting involved

Chicago has an active aviation safety community, and local input helps shape this work. Operators interested in learning more or taking part can contact Shania Gordon at shaniag@cabaa.com.

A Word from the CABAA ATC Committee

For future CABAA safety newsletters we are going to try something new. CABAA’s ATC committee, led by Cecil Barbato, a Senior Captain with a Chicago-based corporate flight department, will weigh in on news and events going on in our corner of the National Airspace System (NAS). For those who are not familiar, CABAA’s ATC committee is made up of a group of operators that are based at and represent the various satellite airports that business aviation frequents. This model offers area operators a conduit to the professionals on the other side of the mic to promote constructive conversation between controllers and users at the most local level.

Additionally, the CABAA ATC Committee represents the broader regional aviation community through various industry forums such as the Chicago Focus Group (CFG) or Midway Runway Safety Action Team (MDW-RSAT). This ensures that the business aviation community has a voice to advocate for system level improvement and infrastructure development that serves our membership.

CFG

The Chicago Focus Group (CFG) is the gold standard for a multi-agency aviation working group and serves to bring together those who manage, operate, control, improve and use the airspace in and around Chicago. CFG meets monthly and its membership is made up of representatives from the FAA Command Center, FAA Airports District Office, the FAA Regional Administrator, Chicago Department of Aviation, Chicago Center (ZAU), Chicago TRACON (C90), National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), Local Control Air Traffic Managers and Industry. Industry is made up of representatives from the major airlines and CABAA. This forum serves to allow those that make up the human side of NAS infrastructure and the users of that infrastructure a space to debrief and improve on recent events and plan and execute future initiatives. Airspace-specific initiatives that brought in CABAA following the CFG conversation have included the MDW Class C redesign and RNAV (GPS) 30 Approach to PWK.

Future planned initiatives include the redesign of ORD Class B to support the O’Hare Modernization Plan (OMP) and O’Hare’s continued move to East/West flow. This will inevitably result in airspace changes to the satellite airports that we as users frequent. CABAA will have representation via the ATC Committee in these discussions and our section of the newsletter moving forward will allow us to both communicate these changes and solicit input from you as CABAA members.

CABAA Visual Departure – KPWK

Recent audits of aviation charts in our area have indicated lesser use of some procedures. Namely, the CABAA Visual Departure procedure’s usage is in question. Is it still used, or could it be removed from Chart supplements? The committee’s perspective is that the procedure is seldom used because ORD continues to spend less time landing Runway 22L/R. Historically, the CABAA Visual Departure has been used by pilots to reduce the departure delays from Executive when O’Hare is in RW 22L/R landing configuration. However, the visual waypoints (particularly VPRAN and VPAON) are FMS-loadable and can aid in flying the VFR circle to Runway 34 at KPWK – creating an off-label use case for this procedure and its associated visual waypoints. Take a moment to let us know how or if you use this procedure or if you would support its decommissioning. Tell us here: CABAA Visual Departure Survey

Go Direct – A Word From ATC

For this and future editions we will also ensure the feedback funnel points back to our member users. The segment will include commentary, clarification, and asks from those that work diligently to ensure separation and keep us safe – from the other side of the microphone. All sectors were asked for participation this time and Roy Guerrero, NATCA Rep and local controller at the MDW Air Traffic Control Tower put together some housekeeping items for Midway international:

When taxiing for departure, unless instructed otherwise, you should always be on Tower Frequency when holding short of your assigned departure runway.
Runways 4L/22R, and for props less than 12,500lbs 31L/13R are the G/A offload runway. We utilize these runways often for G/A to land to keep an efficient traffic flow. Know that you will often be asked to "change to" one of these runways after being transferred from Chicago TRACON to MDW Tower. Pilots still have the right to deny the request to "change to" the parallel runway if you are unable to land that runway. Know that we are asking for that change to facilitate other operations at MDW.
Engine starts do not have to be requested with the tower if you are on the ramp.
If you are ever unsure of an instruction, please ask for clarification.

We look forward to using this space each issue to keep you informed and bring your input to the table. We will continue to serve our member operators and support safe and efficient operations in our corner of the National Airspace System.

For questions and inquiries, contact the ATC Committee at ATCcommittee@CABAA.com.

Getting Better at Getting Better: Continuous Improvement in SMS

You’d never accept a passenger manifest that read “some people and their bags,” so SMS vocabulary deserves the same precision. Continuous Improvement is more than a “do better” slogan; it’s the hallmark of a positive Safety Culture.

“We have achieved an unprecedented level of safety because we are never satisfied with the status quo and are always seeking improvement. Complacency has no place in our duty to the American public, and we can never rest on our accomplishments. Aviation Safety requires a team effort from all stakeholders and must be addressed from all perspectives.” [1]

Of all our Safety Management System (SMS) concepts, Continuous Improvement (or Continuous Process Improvement) seems to be the most resistant to definition. In over 250 pages of Advisory Circular, Continuous Improvement receives little mention. Where it does appear, there are few clues as to whether Continuous Improvement is a process, an outcome, or a theory in development:

“An organization that has a positive safety culture embraces open communication and continuous improvement” [2]
“A key outcome of Safety Assurance is continuous improvement.” [3]

In aviation safety, some terms are easily understood because they relate well to daily life [4]. Mishap Prevention is one that comes to mind – we look ahead into busy intersections; we clean up spills in the workplace. Continuous Improvement, on the other hand, lacks that context and would benefit from some explanation, perhaps from another safety-critical profession.

One of the clearest references outside of aviation is ISO 45001, the international protocol of Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S) Management Systems. Within it, Clause 10.3 specifies a need to ‘continually improve the suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness of OH&S Management Systems’ by: optimizing Safety Performance, fostering a Safety culture, incentivizing workforce participation in that culture, informing the workforce of their Safety Performance, and documenting those results. [5]

With the foundation laid, we return to Continuous Improvement in aviation, where AC 120-92D, SMS for Aviation Service Providers, states: “…processes to correct Safety Performance deficiencies identified in the assessments conducted under CFR § 5.73.” [2] For those unfamiliar with this terminology, we’ll parse the FAA’s words.

“…processes to correct Safety Performance deficiencies identified in the assessments conducted under CFR § 5.73. Actions integral to an effective SMS, but whose methods aren’t specified in Part 5 (Code of Federal Regulations).
“…processes to correct Safety Performance deficiencies identified in the assessments conducted under CFR § 5.73.” To close any gap between the desired Safety Objectives and the actual Safety accomplishments.
“…processes to correct Safety Performance deficiencies identified in the assessments conducted under CFR § 5.73. Measuring SMS Performance through the analysis of Safety Risk Controls and identification of new Hazards. Note: See CFR § 5.73 for the full list of assessment criteria.

Restated, if your SMS is underperforming, Continuous Improvement is the remedy. Now, what about the second FAA citation − the “keep getting better” version of Continuous Improvement?

“…to ensure that the aviation organization corrects substandard safety performance identified during the Safety Performance Assessment in order to continuously improve safety.” Which is to say that an organization must practice Continuous Improvement in order for it to continuously improve. [2]

In short, we have introduced a process within Safety Management intended to address poor performance and bring about cultural change. Ideally, your organization will be known for its success in both.

Sources:

[1 FAA Continuous Improvement Website: https://www.faa.gov/safety/continuous-improvement
[2] AC 120-92D, Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers (2024)
[3] AC 150/5200-37D, Safety Management Systems for Airports (2023)
[4] What is safety? Contemporary definitions and interpretations across North America. (Raheemy et al., 2025)
[5] ISO 45001:2018, Occupational health and safety management systems ─ Requirements with guidance for use. (ISO, 2018)

Recurrent Readiness: A Pilot's Roadmap to Currency After Time Off

At some point or another, many pilots have to step out of the flight deck. Regardless of the cause, returning to flying requires attention to pilot currency, and more importantly, proficiency. Aviation regulations exist to ensure pilots maintain a minimum level of recent flight experience before acting as pilot in command (PIC). These rules help protect both pilots and passengers by ensuring that essential skills remain sharp. That being said, legal minimums may differ from personal minimums, and it is the PIC’s responsibility to make sure they are setting appropriate safety standards for themselves and maintaining them.

In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) outlines pilot currency requirements in 14 CFR Part 61, including flight review requirements and recent flight experience rules. A typical example is instrument currency: an instrument-rated pilot must log six instrument approaches, holding procedures, and course intercepting/tracking within the preceding six calendar months to act as pilot in command under IFR. If those requirements are not met within the six-month period, pilots may regain currency by completing the procedures with a safety pilot or instructor; after twelve months, an Instrument Proficiency Check (IPC) becomes necessary.

While regulations establish legal minimums, the aviation community widely recognizes that true proficiency requires more frequent practice than regulatory currency alone. Pilots returning from a break often experience reduced situational awareness, slower decision-making, and difficulty adapting to rapidly changing flight conditions. These challenges can appear in both general aviation and professional aviation operations as well.

Below are common issues pilots face when returning to flight and strategies to mitigate them.

General Aviation Pilots Common Mistakes

Assuming legal currency equals proficiency. Many pilots meet the minimum regulatory requirements but still lack confidence in demanding scenarios.
Over-reliance on automation. Pilots returning from a break may depend heavily on automation and struggle should hand-flying become necessary.
Poor instrument scan and workload management. Instrument skills deteriorate quickly during extended breaks, making it harder to maintain a consistent instrument scan or manage multiple tasks in IMC.
Incomplete pre-flight planning. Rusty pilots may underestimate the planning required for a proper safe flight.

Mitigation Strategies

Schedule a refresher flight with a CFI before flying solo again.
Conduct simulator or training device sessions to rebuild instrument scanning skills.
Practice hand-flying approaches instead of relying solely on autopilot.
Start with short VFR flights to rebuild confidence before returning to more complex missions.

Business Aviation Professionals Common Mistakes

Professional pilots in corporate or charter operations face additional operational complexity when returning from a break. These pilots must maintain not only regulatory currency but also company-specific training requirements and aircraft-specific proficiency.

Complacency from previous experience
Reduced crew coordination. After time away from the cockpit, pilots may initially struggle with communication flow and crew resource management (CRM).
Underestimating procedural workload. Complex airspace, international operations, and performance calculations require quick decision-making that can degrade during long breaks.

Mitigation Strategies

Complete formal recurrent training programs prior to returning to line operations.
Use simulator sessions to rehearse abnormal and emergency procedures.
Emphasize crew resource management refreshers to rebuild cockpit communication habits.
Conduct reintroduction flights with experienced captains or instructors.

Returning to the flight deck after a break is a common part of many aviators’ careers which requires more than meeting minimum regulatory requirements. By recognizing common pitfalls and intentionally rebuilding proficiency through structured training, pilots can ensure their return to flight is safe and successful.

Whether flying a single-engine piston aircraft or a multi-million-dollar business jet, the principle remains the same: currency is the minimum requirement and proficiency is the real goal.

Sources:

A Troubling Reversal: Business Aviation's Deadliest Year Since 2011 and What It Means for the Midwest

The numbers are hard to dismiss. In 2025, business aviation suffered its worst safety record since 2011—143 people killed across 35 fatal accidents, representing a staggering 53.8% year-over-year increase in fatalities according to preliminary data compiled by Aviation International News (AIN). Business jet fatalities alone surged 171.4%, from 21 deaths in 2024 to 57 in 2025. Total business aircraft accidents reached 104, a 15.6% increase from the prior year. For an industry that had been on a generally positive safety trajectory, these figures demand examination—not just at the global level, but right here in our own Midwest region.

The 2025 Global Picture: A Troubling Reversal

AIN's year-end analysis paints a sobering picture. Of the 104 total accidents in 2025, 35 were fatal—nearly one in three. Turboprop fatalities climbed 19.4%, rising from 72 to 86. In the United States, four fatal business jet accidents occurred, all under Part 91 operations, continuing a concerning pattern in which non-commercial flights drive the majority of deadly incidents. Internationally, the situation was far worse: non-U.S. business jet fatalities leapt from just 6 in 2024 to 42 in 2025, with charter operations accounting for half of those deaths.

Closer to Home: Chicago and Midwest Incidents in Focus

The Midwest, and Chicago’s dense network of business and general aviation airports, is far from immune to these trends. Chicago Executive Airport (KPWK) in Wheeling—situated just eight nautical miles north of O’Hare in some of the most complex airspace in the country—has seen a troubling pattern of runway excursion events involving business jets in recent years, with CRM and situational awareness failures featuring prominently across multiple investigations.

The most recent high-profile event at PWK occurred on September 3, 2025, when a Gulfstream G150 overran Runway 34 on landing and crashed through the airport perimeter fence, coming to rest with its nose just short of Hintz Road. The aircraft had departed Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI) and was landing in light rain on a runway reported as 100% wet. According to NTSB preliminary findings, the aircraft touched down approximately 2,800 feet down the 5,001-foot runway—leaving only 2,200 feet of pavement remaining. The right wing sustained substantial damage, and an Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS) at the runway end halted the aircraft before it reached the roadway.The FAA and NTSB investigation remains ongoing.

PWK’s Runway 34 was also the scene of a serious excursion five years earlier. On October 21, 2020, a Learjet 60 on a Part 135 nonscheduled charter flight from Cleveland—carrying two pilots and six passengers—overran the runway after the crew misidentified Runway 30 as Runway 34 during a late-night visual approach with the tower closed. The NTSB probable cause cited the crew’s misidentification of the landing runway. Runway 30 is only 3,983 feet long, well short of the 4,790 feet the captain had calculated as required landing distance; the aircraft struck the perimeter fence before coming to rest. No one was injured, but the Learjet sustained substantial damage. The investigation exposed significant CRM deficiencies: their pre-arrival briefing was disjointed and the heading checklist item went unverified in the final seconds before touchdown—a textbook example of how experience alone does not substitute for disciplined crew coordination.

Beyond fatal accidents, the Chicago area has also seen an uptick in serious runway incursion events. In February 2025, a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 was forced to execute a go-around at Chicago Midway International Airport (KMDW) when a business jet entered the active runway without authorization—an incident captured on video and investigated by the FAA. According to public records reviewed by the Chicago Tribune and Fox 32, O'Hare and Midway have collectively logged dozens of close-call reports in NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System in recent years, with pilots describing conditions at times as 'the wild, wild west.' An FAA risk audit of the nation's 45 busiest airports—including both O'Hare and Midway—was underway in early 2025, reflecting growing institutional concern about runway incursion trends.

A Historical Lookback: Fatal Accident Trends in the Chicago Region

Chicago's aviation history is punctuated by tragedies that reshaped national safety policy. The most notorious remains American Airlines Flight 191 on May 25, 1979, when an improper maintenance procedure caused an engine to separate from the wing on takeoff from O'Hare, killing all 271 aboard—still the deadliest U.S. aviation accident in history. In 1994, American Eagle Flight 4184, an ATR 72 turboprop, lost control in an icing-induced uncommanded roll in a holding pattern 60 miles southeast of Chicago, killing all 68 aboard and ultimately prompting sweeping changes to icing certification standards. The 2005 Southwest Airlines overrun at Midway, in which a Boeing 737 skidded through a boundary fence in heavy snow and struck a vehicle on Central Avenue—killing a 6-year-old child—led to enhanced runway safety area standards nationwide.

In the business and general aviation sector, ASN's Aviation Safety Database and the NTSB's CAROL query system document a persistent, if less publicized, pattern of fatal accidents across the greater Chicago area and Illinois—ranging from loss-of-control events on departure from DuPage and Chicago Executive Airport (KPWK) to CFIT accidents on approaches to regional Illinois airports. Across multiple years in ASN's database, Illinois ranks among the top Midwest states for turboprop and business jet accident events, reflecting the state's high GA traffic density, complex airspace, and demanding winter weather environment.

What 2025's Numbers Mean for Operators

The 2025 data carry clear operational implications. The concentration of U.S. fatal accidents in Part 91 operations—four of four domestic fatal business jet accidents in 2025 occurring under Part 91—should not breed complacency in the charter and managed aircraft world. It should instead reinforce the value of structured SMS programs, flight risk assessment tools, recurrent CRM training, and external safety auditing. The industry's tendency to conflate 'no regulatory incident' with 'safe operation' has historically preceded the very statistical reversals AIN and the Flight Safety Foundation are now highlighting.

The 2025 data also reaffirm the outsized risk of approach and landing phases—the PWK excursion events documented above are not outliers, but examples of a nationally recognized pattern in which runway overruns account for a disproportionate share of business aviation hull losses and fatalities. For operations in Midwest winter conditions—with short runways, 100% wet surfaces, complex Class B and D airspace interactions, and limited visual cues at night—stabilized approach criteria, contaminated runway performance calculations, and thorough pre-arrival crew briefings are not administrative formality. They are the difference between a safe arrival and the next accident report.

The industry has demonstrated before—after 1979, after 1994, after 2005—that it can learn from tragedy and reform. The question now is whether 2025's numbers will be treated as an anomaly or as a call to action. For operators flying in and out of Chicago's busy GA and business aviation airports, the answer should be clear.

Based on AIN Online, Aviation Safety Network (ASN), NTSB, FAA in April 2026.

Is Your Go Team Ready?

We all can agree that the loss of any human life is a tragedy, regardless of if they are an airline passenger, or flying on a privately owned airplane. Aircraft accident response requires a large amount of preparation to be ready for the unthinkable (NBAA). All organizations can understand the importance of having personnel prepared to handle an emergency, however the difference between resources available in-house for private operators compared to their airline counterparts with regard to response, is immense.

ALPA provides a tremendous amount of support for affiliated airlines in accidents, whereas business aviation operators are left to their own devices. In a major accident, the Safety Board (NTSB) will typically extend party member status to organizations who can provide technical assistance to the investigation (including the operator). Having a team of people available who are trained and ready to be involved in an accident is crucial so you can help solve imminent safety concerns, identify the root cause and ultimately allow for the best recommendation moving forward. This participation is in the interest of your individual operation’s risk identification, but also for the aviation industry as a whole moving forward.

Business operators understand the significance of being involved in an investigation, but many simply do not have manpower to comply with best practices. Having management flying the accident aircraft, your own team being investigated for cause, and several staff having personal connections with the deceased are just a few of the challenges that small operators face. It’s no surprise that just trying to keep the remaining business afloat takes all the resources that some operations have.

Don Chupp, CEO of Fireside Partners Inc., has expert insight on the differences between the framework of actions following an airline and business aviation emergency response. He described that airlines have a culture of openness and honesty with regard to accidents, near misses and lessons learned. It is largely agreed upon that any accident in their sector of the industry affects the industry at large, regardless of which airline was specifically involved.

Aviation safety in general is promoted as “learning” and “just,” a system that learns from accidents so we all can be safer at the end of the day. However, without a union binding business aviation operators together, it becomes difficult if not impossible to build the same trust and value that airlines gain from sharing insight. Chupp describes that what we need in our industry (business aviation) is “unapologetic honesty.” Safety should not be competitive, and we need to use each other, and our shared insight to prevent the next accident.

Fireside Partners asks operators important questions such as:

Is your ERP a truth telling document? Are positions listed not only well trained to carry out their responses to any emergency, but do they have the authority and autonomy to carry out what is needed in a response?
Does your team have Go Team members who are not only trained for what to expect, but ready to contribute to an investigation? Do they understand their rights as a party member? Do they understand what they will need to do to assist crews, and passengers affected?
It’s irrefutable that emergency preparation is important for business aviation, the question that remains from operator to operator is how will they practice to ensure business continuity when the worst happens?

Sources for Emergency Preparedness Training:

Safety First - Even On the Ground

Operators spend a lot of time and resources to fulfill audit standards measuring flight safety, while seeing insurance claims coming in year after year for hangar rash, or FOD ingestion. Damage to aircraft on the ground is seen often from air bridges causing damage and towing, often affecting the landing gear, wings or empennage.

Recently, Part 91 and 135 operators have been seeking IS-BAH compliance as self-handlers, whereas former ground handlers to seek implementation were almost all FBOs. Bank of America is the first to successfully implement IS-BAH as a self-handler. Operators are discovering the significance of ground handling procedures within their own teams. Despite it’s significance to our bottom line, and to the safety of our operation, there is a fraction of IS-BAH auditors when compared to IS-BAO. With potential for towing mishaps, misfueling, and a plethora of other potential risks, there is no doubt that more ground handling standardization will be one of the areas of industry focus in years to come.